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Abortion Provider’s Poll Shows Public are Pro-Choice

A recent poll has shown that the public continue to support women having the right to choose to have an abortion. The poll was commissioned by Bpas, a charity that provides around 50,000 abortions each year, and conducted by Mori. 63% of those asked agreed with the statement, “If a woman wants an abortion, she should not have to continue with her pregnancy.” Bpas have reportedly cited the data collected as a reason to liberalise current abortion legislation.

There is always a concern with surveys commissioned by a group with a clear vested interest, such as this one: the way that the questions were framed might have distorted the results. Interestingly, some of the questions in this poll were varied, making it possible to see this phenomenon in action.

Half of those polled were asked about their attitude towards the current law which allows abortion up to 24 weeks with the consent of two doctors. The other half were asked about their attitude towards the current law which allows abortion up to 24 weeks but were not told about the requirement for doctors’ consent. 54% of the first group agreed with the current law, while 28% opposed it; 46% of the second group agreed with the current law, while 38% opposed it. This serves to illustrate how much difference the way that questions are framed can make.

The conclusion drawn from the data by Bpas is also of interest. If their argument were that the public endorsement of abortion implies that there is nothing wrong with it (call this “the moral argument”), then it would clearly commit the appeal to popularity fallacy. The moral status of an action and public opinion towards it are two different matters. If the majority of the population backed racial discrimination, for example, then that wouldn’t make it right.

If, on the other hand, Bpas’s argument is not to do with the moral status of abortion but with the legal status of abortion (call this “the legal argument”), then they may be on more solid ground. The argument, “The public backs abortion on demand, therefore the government should permit abortion on demand”, need not be understood as drawing a conclusion about whether abortion is morally right or wrong. Instead, it could be understood as drawing a conclusion about how the government should legislate.

Why is the second argument better than the first? Because it rests on a more plausible assumption.

The moral argument, in inferring the conclusion “There is nothing wrong with abortion” from the reason “Most people believe that there is nothing wrong with abortion”, makes an assumption: “Whatever most people believe is the case.” This assumption, however, is often false; often the majority opinion is incorrect. This is why appeals to popularity are fallacious.

The assumption made by the legal argument is slightly different. The legal argument infers the conclusion “The government should permit abortion on demand” from the reason “Most people want the government to permit abortion on demand.” The assumption made by this argument is that the government ought to do whatever most people want the government to do. This assumption is not obviously true–we can imagine situations in which following public opinion would lead to catastrophe–but it is more defensible than that made by the moral argument. In a democratic system, where the government is elected to rule for the people, the legal argument might just fly.

One thing that this shows is the importance of clarifying precisely what an argument is before it can be assessed. Several different conclusions are attributed to Bpas in several different places: e.g. that abortion should be available on demand, that the current legislation should be relaxed, and that it is time for the government to review abortion legislation. The stronger the conclusion they draw from the data, the weaker their argument gets.

Just Not Cricket

Cricket Umpire Darrell Hair has been under fire for charging the Pakistan team with ball-tampering in a recent test match against England. Having examined the ball, and conferred with a colleague, he deducted five runs from Pakistan’s total as a penalty. Pakistan were, at this point, well in the lead in the match, but staged a sit-in protest in the dressing room, refusing to continue play. The match was then abandoned and awarded to England.

Since all that happened, Hair has been accused of racism, of systematically favouring the opponents of Asian nations over the years. The International Cricket Council were due to hold a disciplinary hearing to examine the ball-tampering charge, and hopefully resolve the furore surrounding Hair, when they called a press-conference. In it, ICC Chief Executive Malcolm Speed made what the press has labelled a shocking revelation: Hair had offered to retire from umpiring in return for a secret payment of $500,000. For full transparency, they published the e-mail correspondence in which Hair made the offer.

There are two interpretations of the e-mail exchange. According to the first, Hair was feeling the pressure and offered the ICC a solution that was in both their best interests and his. If he stayed, the ICC would be stuck with an Umpire who couldn’t preside over many matches due to the allegations of bias. If he stayed, he would have to continue to face down criticism from the press and from his opponents in cricket. The game would be tarnished; his career, ruined. The $500,000 would pay up his contract, which had several years left to run, and get both parties out of difficulty.

As Malcolm Speed admitted, however, there was a much more sinister reading of events. He urged the press not to accept it. According to this reading, Hair was blackmailing the ICC, using his power to contain the emerging crisis in order to extract money from them. Some even suggested that he might have deliberately created the scandal in order to get himself a pay-off.

How credible was Speed’s claim that this more sinister view of events was mistaken, that Hair had acted honourably throughout?

Speed’s reputation, on the face of it, is solid enough. As the Chief Executive of the ICC, he certainly has high status; he is in an important position of trust. This lends credibility to his claim.

His ability to see is more limited; it’s difficult for him to tell what was going on in Hair’s head. Yes, he had access to the e-mail correspondence, but he admitted in the press conference that this could be read in either of two ways. Unless he had private correspondence or conversations with Hair in addition to the published e-mails, then his access to the evidence is the same as everyone else’s, and so he is basing his interpretation of events on background knowledge rather than clear first-hand evidence.

Speed certainly suffers from a vested interest. As someone with a great deal invested in the cricket, and whose responsiblity is to protect the sport, he has a lot to lose if the reputation of cricket is damaged. This certainly weakens his sympathic interpretation of Hair’s actions.

Speed’s level of expertise is a little difficult to assess. In this context, expertise would involve knowledge of Hair. Is Hair the type of person who would try to make money out of a potential disaster? Without better knowledge of the relationship between the two, it’s impossible to tell whether Speed possesses this expertise.

Finally, there is the issue of neutrality, which is again difficult to assess. If Speed and Hair have had a long and productive professional relationship, as may well be the case, then Speed may well have a bias towards Hair, and so a reason to defend him. If, on the other hand, they have no such rapport, or even a disliking for each other, then things may be different.

To reach an overall judgement on the credibility of Speed’s claim, then, his reputation and possible expertise must be weighed against his poor ability to see, vested interest, and possible bias.

What’s your judgement?